Changing mix of medical care services: Stylized facts and implications for price indexes

Ana Aizcorbe, Nicole Nestoriak

A R T I C L E   I N F O

Article history:
Received 21 October 2008
Received in revised form 16 July 2010
Accepted 12 April 2011
Available online xxx

JEL classification:
O47
C43

Keywords:
Price Indexes
Productivity
Health care spending

A B S T R A C T

The utilization of health care services has undergone several important shifts in recent years that have implications for the cost of medical care. We empirically document the presence of these shifts for a broad list of medical conditions and assess the implications for price indexes. Following the earlier literature, we compare the growth of two price measures: one that tracks expenditures for the services actually provided to treat conditions and another that holds the mix of those services fixed over time. Using retrospective claims data for a sample of commercially insured patients, we find that, on average, expenditures to treat diseases rose 11% from 2003Q1 to 2005Q4 and would have risen even faster, 18%, had the mix of services remained fixed at the 2003Q1 levels. This suggests that fixed-basket price indexes, as are used in the official statistics, could overstate true price growth significantly.

1. Introduction

The utilization of health care services has undergone several important shifts in recent years that have implications for the cost of medical care. While inpatient care has been declining, surgeries at outpatient departments and other venues that do not require a costly overnight stay have been rising.1 Anecdotal reports suggest that innovations in prescription drugs have also prompted changes in the utilization of non-drug care and recent studies suggest that cost-offsetting effects do occur.2 Advances in medical equipment that minimize the need for professional administration and monitoring have made home care a more viable alternative to hospital care for some conditions.3 Among patients with private insurance,

the mix of medical care shifted towards outpatient services and pharmaceuticals during the period from 2001 to 2006 (Bundorf et al., 2009).

Changes like these in the way that care is delivered can potentially lower the expenditures needed to treat certain medical conditions; however, these shifts in utilization are not captured in official price indexes for medical care.4 The official price indexes reflect what is happening to the provider prices of a fixed basket of goods and services. By design, these indexes do not take into account the effect on expenditures from shifts in the utilization of goods and services in treating medical conditions. If provider prices are increasing but patients are shifting from higher to lower cost services, a standard price index will only capture the effect of increased provider prices. Following Cutler et al. (1998), we call these fixed-basket indexes “service price indexes,” or SPIs. They answer the question “What would expenditures be today if patients received the same services today as they did in the past?” Alternative indexes have been proposed that would also capture the effect of service shifts on costs (Schultze and Mackie, 2002). These indexes track the actual expenditures associated with an episode of care, without holding the service mix fixed. For example,

2 See Chernen and Hendrick (2009) for a recent review.
3 See, for example, http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/pediatrics;118/2/834.pdf for pediatric home care.
0167-6296/$ – see front matter. Published by Elsevier B.V.
if chronic episodes of depression are now treated with drug therapy – rather than the more costly talk therapy – the alternative index takes into account any cost reductions associated with the switch when quantifying what has happened to the cost of treating depression. We call these “medical care expenditure indexes” (MCEs) to emphasize that they track the overall cost of care (all expenditures), not the costs of the individual services.

There exists a body of work that identified and quantified this problem for an important set of conditions – heart attacks (Cutler et al., 1998, 2001), cataracts (Shapiro et al., 2001), and depression (Berndt et al., 2001a). They calculate quality-adjusted MCE indexes that take into account better health outcomes and find that they show slower price growth than quality-unadjusted SPls. In most cases, both shifts in care and improved outcomes contribute to the gap between the indexes, suggesting that ignoring indexes that take into account better health outcomes and find the shifts in care that raised expenditures.

To measure changes in quality, something very difficult to do for price growth (as was done for selected conditions in previous demonstrations for the economy as a whole are large because the health sector makes up a large share of GDP.

Citations for the economy as a whole are large because the health care expenditure index for condition d in period 2 as $c_{2d}$. Operationally, it is calculated by totaling dollars spent on all services to treat the condition and dividing those dollars by the number of cases treated: $\sum_{s} c_{2d,s} / N_{2d}^1$, where $c$ is the cost, $x$ is the quantity of the service provided (e.g., the number of encounters at physician offices or the number of inpatient hospital stays in 2003 is treated as equivalent to an inpatient hospital stay in 2005). Finally, one would ideally want to make adjustments for changes in patient case mix to account for the possibility that the severity of illness is changing.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the decomposition that we use to trace differences in the MCE and SPI indexes back to service shifts. Section 3 discusses methodological issues and the data. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 concludes.

2. Service shifts and price indexes

We compare the MCE and SPI indexes to quantify the presence of shifts in the utilization of services and to assess their importance and contribution to differences in the indexes. The previous literature used the concept of “episode of care” as the fundamental building block for MCE price indexes. This requires two things: first, one must link services to the diseases or conditions that are being treated. Second, it also requires that one choose a time frame – measuring costs over an episode of care or measuring costs incurred during a fixed period of time. In this paper, we use fixed periods of time to identify industry shifts.

Formally, we denote expenditures for the services used to treat condition d in period 2 as $c_{2d}$. Operationally, it is calculated by totaling dollars spent on all services to treat the condition and dividing those dollars by the number of cases treated: $\sum_{s} c_{2d,s} / N_{2d}^1$, where $c$ is the cost, $x$ is the quantity of the service provided (e.g., the number of encounters at physician offices or the number of inpatient hospital stays in 2003 is treated as equivalent to an inpatient hospital stay in 2005). Finally, one would ideally want to make adjustments for changes in patient case mix to account for the possibility that the severity of illness is changing.

The ratio of this price in period 2 to that of period 1 gives disease d's component for an overall MCE:

\[
\text{MCE}_d = \frac{c_{2d}^2}{c_{1d}^2} = \frac{\sum_{s} (c_{2d,s} / x_{2d,s}) / N_{2d}^1}{\sum_{s} (c_{1d,s} / x_{1d,s}) / N_{1d}^1}
\]

An SPI index for this condition holds the basket of services in period 2 to that which was provided in period 1:

\[
\text{SPI}_d = \frac{\sum_{s} (c_{2d,s} x_{2d,s}^1) / N_{1d}^1}{\sum_{s} (c_{1d,s} x_{1d,s}) / N_{1d}^1}
\]

i.e., the x's and N's are held at period 1 levels. The numerator tells you how much the services provided to patients treated in period 1 would have cost at period 2 prices.

Differences in the MCE and SPI arise when the level or mix of services change. Writing this down formally gives us an expression that we can use to quantify the overall importance of shifts across services. As shown in Appendix A, the relationship between these two price measures may be written as:

\[
\text{MCE}_d = \text{SPI}_d + \sum_{s} (\text{SPI}_{d,s}(dU_{d,s} - 1))
\]

In the last term, $\text{SPI}_{d,s} = (c_{2d,s} x_{2d,s}^1) / \sum_{s} (c_{1d,s} x_{1d,s})$ is the contribution of service $s$ to the SPI index for condition d (i.e., $\text{SPI}_d = \sum_s \text{SPI}_{d,s}$) and $dU_{d,s}$ gives the change in utilization per case for service $s$: $dU_{d,s} = (x_{2d,s}^1 / N_{2d}^1) / (x_{1d,s} / N_{1d}^1)$. If there are no changes in the utilization of any of the services (all $dU_{d,s} = 1$), the two price measures coincide. In that case, the only expenditure growth comes from increases in provider prices.

Any change in utilization either augments or reduces the contribution of each service to expenditure growth. Consider the treatment of chronic depression when there are only two types
of services, drug and talk therapy. The change in the annual cost of treating this condition can be measured with an MCE index:

$$MCE = SPI + SPI_{talk}(dU_{talk} - 1) + SPI_{talk}(dU_{talk} - 1)$$

(4)

where subscripts denoting that these are all for depression only have been dropped. All else held equal, any shifts towards the lower-cost drug therapy would increase the number of prescriptions per patient ($dU_{drug} > 1$), accounting for the fact that per patient expenditures on drugs grew more than drug prices. Similarly, a drop in the number of office visits for talk therapy has the opposite effect: $dU_{talk} < 1$ and the talk therapy term accounts for the fact that expenditures on therapy grew slower than any change in the price of an office visit.

With just two services, the MCE will show slower growth if utilization shifts towards the lower-cost service or if utilization of all services declines. Shifts in the opposite direction would have the opposite effect. With more than two services, substitution of one service for another does not guarantee a gap between the MCE and SPI indexes: there could be changes in the utilization of other services that would offset that effect.

To aggregate over diseases, we take simple weighted averages of each term in (3), where the weights are the expenditure share for each condition in period 1. Defining $MCE = \sum_d w_d^1 MCE_d$ and $SPI = \sum_d w_d^1 SPI_d$, the aggregate version of the disease-specific decompositions in (3) is

$$MCE = SPI + \sum_d w_d^1 \sum_s [SPI_d(s)(dU_{d,s} - 1)]$$

(5)

We interpret the aggregate MCE index as a weighted average of expenditure growth for underlying diseases, the SPI as the same for services, and the last terms as the average contributions of service shifts to differences in the two indexes. The choice of base period expenditure shares yields an SPI that is very similar to the official price indexes for medical care published by the BLS (see Appendix A). This is useful because it allows us to use (5) to make inferences about what the official price indexes would look like if they accounted for shifts in utilization.

3. Methodological issues and data

3.1. Measuring spending by disease

Constructing indexes and applying our decomposition requires measures of spending by disease. The development of methods to allocate spending by disease is a field unto itself and has not yet generated a consensus on which method is best. Traditionally, studies have used encounter-level data and assigned each encounter to a disease. This is easiest to do with inpatient care, where the confinement is assigned to one condition, or diagnosis related group (DRG). For other types of care, however, encounters are typically associated with more than one diagnosis code and it is not clear how much spending to allocate to each condition.

There are four available methods to deal with this comorbidity issue. First, many studies in this literature use a “primary diagnosis” method that assigns the spending to the first-listed diagnosis (the seminal work is Scitovsky, 1964). Many have noted, however, that the first-listed diagnosis is often not the primary one and, more fundamentally, it is often difficult to identify a primary diagnosis in the face of comorbidities. More recently, Roehrig et al. (2009) used a proportional method that allocated spending from claims with more than one diagnosis using the distributions of spending from claims with only one diagnosis listed; Bradley et al. (2010) used a similar proportional approach. These proportional methods use only the information on each individual claim to allocate the spending. In contrast, Rosen and Cutler (2007) advocate a regression-based approach that allows the data to do the allocation, rather than some a priori definition. Their approach is person-based and uses all available information on diagnoses in the patient’s history.

Finally, there are also computer algorithms that were originally developed for physician profiling that are potentially useful for our purposes. Like the “primary diagnosis” method, these so-called “episode groupers” allocate all spending from individual claim records to a distinct condition. However, the groupers also use other information on the claim (e.g., procedures) and information from the patient’s history to allocate the spending. An additional advantage of using the grouper is that it can use patients’ medical history to assign diseases to drug claims, which typically do not provide a diagnosis.

This is the approach we take in this paper. It has the advantage that one does not need to have extensive medical expertise on each condition to obtain estimates of spending by disease and can instead rely on the medical expertise that was used to develop the algorithm. However, a major drawback is that the algorithms are complex and viewed as a “black box,” in large part because the methods they use to allocate spending—particularly with comorbidities—is not readily transparent. Although one can certainly think of many cases where splitting spending from a claim will seem arbitrary (“is an ACE inhibitor taken by a person with diabetes who has had a heart attack being taken for the diabetes or the heart attack?”), one can think of others where using information in patients’ histories and all information available on a claim could be useful in assigning medical expenditures to disease categories. Work continues to better understand the logic underlying these groupers and exactly how these algorithms make choices in the presence of comorbidities. For now, we take a literal read of the grouper’s allocations as a starting point for learning about the importance of service shifts.

3.2. Data

Our sample, from the Pharmetrics, Inc. data set, contains over 700 million claim records from 21 Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), and Point-of-Service (POS) plans covering about 10 million enrollees and their families over the period from 2003 to 2005 (Table 1). Claims data sets like this have been used in some of the previous case studies that explored problems in price indexes (e.g., Berndt et al., 2001a; Song et al., 2009) and in other studies that document shifts in utilization (Bundorf et al., 2009; Chernew and Fendrick, 2009). The data are a “convenience” sample and are not designed to provide estimates that are representative for commercially insured patients. The bottom panel of Table 1 provides information on the distribution of enrollees. Looking at the distribution of enrollees within a year, our sample has a higher proportion of females, prime age workers (35–54), and youth (0–18) than the population of individuals with private insurance coverage. The disproportionately

---

7 See Rice (1966) and Hodgson and Cohen (1999) for examples of these studies and Rosen and Cutler (2009) for a fuller review of the issues.

8 A recent attempt to characterize these algorithms is Macurdy et al. (2009).

9 According to the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), 51% of individuals with private insurance coverage at any time in 2005 were women. 36% were prime age, and 27% were under 18 years old. With regard to region, 19.7% were from the North East and 24% from the Midwest.
high number of youth in our sample (28–30% in our sample vs 27% in MEPS) and women (54% vs 51% in MEPS) suggests that the plans in our sample cover more families than is typical. Finally, while the data cover all regions of the US, our sample is more concentrated in the Northeast and Midwest than the overall population. To the extent that conditions and treatments for the enrollees in our sample are not representative for commercially insured patients, our estimates will not be representative.

This lack of representativeness is the main drawback of convenience samples such as the one used in this paper. The advantage is that the large number of observations provides a better representation of spending at the high end of the spending distribution and the use of administrative records avoids undercount issues typical of household expenditure surveys (see Aizcorbe et al., 2010).

Looking across the three years of data, there are small increases in the number of enrollees and patients submitting claims. However, the distribution of enrollees by gender, region, and age appears quite stable, lessening the need to control for case mix if one were to construct price indexes.

An observation in the data corresponds to a line item in an “explanation of benefits” form, so each “claim” is made up of various categories (like psychiatric conditions).

We assign claims to an industry (using an identifier for the place of service), a medical condition (using the disease codes assigned by the episode grouper), and to a particular quarter (using the date the service was completed).

We measure the number of cases treated as the number of patients that received treatment for a disease, d, in a given period. Expenditures are measured as the amount received by all providers of the services (including both out-of-pocket pay-


ARTICLE IN PRESS

10.9 11.1 11.3

Number of enrollees (mil) 2003 2004 2005

Gender
Female 54.5% 54.0% 53.9%
Male 45.5% 46.0% 46.1%

Age
0–18 29.7% 28.4% 28.0%
19–24 6.6% 6.7% 6.7%
25–34 13.9% 13.9% 13.7%
35–54 37.1% 37.5% 37.1%
55–64 10.8% 11.9% 12.9%
Over 65 1.9% 1.8% 1.7%

Region
E 22.5% 24.8% 24.3%
MW 26.1% 26.5% 27.8%
S 31.5% 29.2% 30.4%
W 19.8% 19.5% 17.4%

Plans
HMO 29.2% 27.6% 25.9%
PPO 54.6% 55.8% 56.7%
POS 16.3% 16.7% 17.4%

Table 1
Descriptive statistics for Pharmetrics sample.

Table 2
Spending by place of service, 2003Q1.

Place of Service Spending/encounter Total spending

Inpatient hospital $4332 $1488 25.0%
Office visits $105 $1461 24.6%
Pharmacy $87 $1326 22.3%
Outpatient hospital $337 $822 13.8%
Unknown $314 $306 5.1%
Emergency room-hospital $370 $181 3.1%
Ambulatory surgical center $1079 $92 1.5%
Home care $281 $84 1.4%
Other inpatient hospital care $432 $81 1.4%
Independent lab $54 $63 1.1%

$5944 100.0%

Millions Percent

11 This distinction is not numerically important; the results reported in the next section are qualitatively the same to what one obtains when spending in the preventative and administrative classes as well as ongoing drug spending are both excluded.

10 Because our data begin in 2003Q1, we will underestimate the cost of confinements that were in progress over the turn of that year. However, to the extent that our goal is to compare results from the two types of indexes, and that the understatement is the same in both of the indexes, our inferences about treatment shifts and their effect on cost savings should be valid.

Table 3
Allocation of spending by disease, 2003Q1 (million dollars).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major practice category</th>
<th>Spending allocated using diagnoses and procedure codes (million)</th>
<th>Drug codes (NDC)</th>
<th>Total spending (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Infectious diseases</td>
<td>$53.0</td>
<td>$8.1</td>
<td>$61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Endocrinology</td>
<td>$319.4</td>
<td>$36.7</td>
<td>$356.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hematology</td>
<td>$134.9</td>
<td>$2.0</td>
<td>$136.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Psychiatry</td>
<td>$278.0</td>
<td>$36.8</td>
<td>$314.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Chemical dependency</td>
<td>$34.2</td>
<td>$20.8</td>
<td>$34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Neurology</td>
<td>$308.8</td>
<td>$20.8</td>
<td>$329.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ophthalmology</td>
<td>$98.1</td>
<td>$0.3</td>
<td>$98.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Cardiology</td>
<td>$543.4</td>
<td>$113.3</td>
<td>$554.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Otolaryngology</td>
<td>$426.9</td>
<td>$24.4</td>
<td>$451.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Pulmonology</td>
<td>$269.5</td>
<td>$13.5</td>
<td>$283.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Gastroenterology</td>
<td>$475.4</td>
<td>$32.7</td>
<td>$508.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Hepatology</td>
<td>$135.9</td>
<td>$170.3</td>
<td>$313.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Nephrology</td>
<td>$57.7</td>
<td>$3.0</td>
<td>$60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Urology</td>
<td>$167.3</td>
<td>$3.0</td>
<td>$170.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Obstetrics</td>
<td>$263.3</td>
<td>$263.3</td>
<td>$523.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Gynecology</td>
<td>$384.4</td>
<td>$0.4</td>
<td>$384.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Dermatology</td>
<td>$225.7</td>
<td>$6.7</td>
<td>$232.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Orthopedics &amp; rheumatology</td>
<td>$865.6</td>
<td>$8.9</td>
<td>$874.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Neonatology</td>
<td>$115.8</td>
<td>$15.8</td>
<td>$131.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Preventive and administrative</td>
<td>$172.5</td>
<td>$45.3</td>
<td>$217.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Late effects, environmental trauma and poisonings</td>
<td>$32.1</td>
<td>$32.1</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Isolated signs &amp; symptoms</td>
<td>$80.1</td>
<td>$8.3</td>
<td>$88.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$241.9</td>
<td>$259.3</td>
<td>$509.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 1. Aggregate MCE and SPI price indexes for medical care expenditures.

The difference in the two indexes is substantial: over the eleven quarters, the SPI grew nearly 18% while the MCE only grew about 11%. The differences amount to about 2.5 percentage points on the compound annual growth rates – 6.1 percentage points vs 3.7 percentage points. Because our data are not representative it is not appropriate to generalize this finding to the aggregate economy. Despite this caveat, this result provides a sense of the potential importance of these differences. As noted earlier, health spending in 2009 was about 15% of GDP, so if a difference of this magnitude held across all types of patients (i.e. the uninsured, Medicare and Medicaid patients), changing from the current deflator to the MCE index in the national accounts would substantially increase measured real GDP growth by about a quarter percentage point per year.

To explore the sources of these differences, the left panel of Table 4 compares the growth in the two types of price indexes across the 19 major disease groups. The growth rates shown are for the entire 2003–2005 period and represent averages of the growth rates for the individual conditions underlying each group.12

Growth rates for the MCE and SPI indexes – in the first two columns – show that expenditures per patient and the average price of services increased for most major groups over this period. Expenditures for conditions under the cardiology category (line 8) were essentially flat, despite an increase in the prices of services used to treat these conditions. The third column compares the MCE and SPI indexes and shows that, for most conditions, expenditure per patient did not grow as fast as it would have had patients received the same bundle of services in 2005Q4 that patients in 2003Q1 received. There are two exceptions (chemical dependency and obstetrics) that, combined, make up about 10% of total spending and, therefore do not have much influence on the top line.13 Nonetheless, these exceptions are examples where the cost of treating entire diseases rose faster than the cost of the individual treatments, owing to increases in utilization.

This suggests that shifts in the bundle of services are pervasive. To explore the sources of those shifts, the right panel of Table 4 uses (3) to link the differences in the price indexes to shifts in the underlying services. As discussed above, a positive sign reflects an increase in service intensity and a negative sign the opposite. In general, the gap in the indexes seems related to declining utilization at hospitals, maybe related to surgeries done elsewhere.

Looking within specific disease classes, in the orthopedic and rheumatology group (line 18), there is an evident shift from treatment at hospitals and doctors’ offices towards home care and treatment at ambulatory surgical centers that held down expenditures by about 8 percentage points; expenditures per patient would have increased 18% – rather than the actual 11% increase – in the absence of these shifts. Similarly, for conditions in the gastroenterology and ophthalmology classes (lines 11 and 7), shifts towards care at ambulatory surgical centers appear to have held by the solid line. The difference in the two indexes is substantial: over the eleven quarters, the SPI grew nearly 18% while the MCE only grew about 11%. The differences amount to about 2.5 percentage points on the compound annual growth rates – 6.1 percentage points vs 3.7 percentage points. Because our data are not representative it is not appropriate to generalize this finding to the aggregate economy. Despite this caveat, this result provides a sense of the potential importance of these differences. As noted earlier, health spending in 2009 was about 15% of GDP, so if a difference of this magnitude held across all types of patients (i.e. the uninsured, Medicare and Medicaid patients), changing from the current deflator to the MCE index in the national accounts would substantially increase measured real GDP growth by about a quarter percentage point per year.

To explore the sources of these differences, the left panel of Table 4 compares the growth in the two types of price indexes across the 19 major disease groups. The growth rates shown are for

12 Similar tables for the individual diseases are provided in Appendix A.
13 For obstetrics conditions, a look at data for the underlying conditions shows cost savings for uncomplicated conditions – normal pregnancies and uncomplicated neonatal management – and higher costs for conditions that involve complications.
down expenditure growth. Finally, psychiatry, including depression and anxiety disorders (line 4), and endocrinology, including diabetes and obesity (line 2), show shifts towards the use of drugs, suppressing expenditure increases.14

For the other disease classes, the story is more nuanced. For example, many conditions in the cardiology group generally show large declines in inpatient care. These declines are coupled with declines in the intensity of other hospital treatment and office visits, and the numbers indicate the effect of these declines on expenditures is not offset by increases in other services. Similar issues pertain to other conditions.

5. Conclusion

Our empirical work suggests that there have been shifts in treatment intensity that had an important effect on expenditure growth and that, on average, those treatment shifts served to hold down expenditure growth for patients in our sample. These shifts appear to be numerically important and pervasive. As noted by health economists, standard price indexes provided by statistical agencies do not capture this effect and, thus, overstate how much of rising health care costs can be attributed to the rising cost of individual treatments. Although our results are for a select subset of the population, applying them broadly suggests that inflation may be overstated by as much as 0.3 percentage points a year.

Our work points to the potential importance of this issue and underscores the importance of further work to form more precise estimates with sufficiently broad coverage of patients to make inferences about the cost of treating diseases for the nation as a whole. While one focus in this paper is on creating an aggregate price index that covers all diseases, our methodology also allows for a disease by disease decomposition of price growth into within and between treatment groups. We leave any further analysis into changing utilization of treatments by disease for future work.

We feel this research presents a step towards an improved price index. While one can easily imagine controlling for observable demographics to control for changes in mix, this approach would not allow researchers to fully disentangle pure price growth from increasing disease severity. Similarly, our somewhat coarse treatment indexes are a combination of pure price growth and improvements in technology. Finally, outcome measures are necessary in order to measure changes in quality.

While these issues are important for the construction of an ideal price index, they do not affect our comparisons of the MCE and SPI indexes or our ability to assess the source of any differences. As such, we are able to demonstrate the potential importance for official statistics of ignoring shifts in services that affect the expenditures needed to treat medical conditions.

Appendix A.

A.1. Derivation of (3): The MCEd and SPId indexes were defined in (1) and (2) as:

\[
MCE_d = \frac{\sum c_{d,s}^2 x_{d,s}^2 / N_d^2}{\sum c_{d,s}^2 x_{d,s}^1 / N_d^1}, \quad (A1)
\]

\[
SPI_d = \frac{\sum c_{d,s}^2 x_{d,s}^1}{\sum c_{d,s}^1 x_{d,s}^1}, \quad (A2)
\]

We want to derive (3), which boils down to showing that

\[
MCE_d - SPI_d = \sum_{d|s} SPI_{d,s}(dU_{d,s} - 1). \quad (A3)
\]

with \(SPI_{d,s} = c_{d,s}^2 x_{d,s}^1 / (\sum_{d,s} c_{d,s}^1 x_{d,s}^1)\) (i.e., \(SPI_d = \sum_s SPI_{d,s}\)) and \(dU_{d,s} = (x_{d,s}^2 / N_d^2) / (x_{d,s}^1 / N_d^1)\).

To show this, we restate the two indexes in terms of \(SPI_{d,s}\) and \(dU_{d,s}\) and then take the difference in (A3). Beginning with \(MCE_d\), first multiply each term in the numerator by \([x_{d,s}^1 / N_d^1]/[x_{d,s}^1 / N_d^1]\) and restate it as:

\[
MCE_d = \frac{\sum_{d,s} c_{d,s}^2 x_{d,s}^2 / N_d^2 (x_{d,s}^1 / N_d^1)}{\sum_{d,s} c_{d,s}^1 x_{d,s}^1 / N_d^1}, \quad (A3)
\]

We feel this research presents a step towards an improved price index for medical care though there are a number of issues that would need to be resolved if one were to construct an ideal price index. While one can easily imagine controlling for observable demographics to control for changes in mix, this approach would not allow researchers to fully disentangle pure price growth from increasing disease severity. Similarly, our somewhat coarse treatment indexes are a combination of pure price growth and improvements in technology. Finally, outcome measures are necessary in order to measure changes in quality.

While these issues are important for the construction of an ideal price index, they do not affect our comparisons of the MCE and SPI indexes or our ability to assess the source of any differences. As such, we are able to demonstrate the potential importance for official statistics of ignoring shifts in services that affect the expenditures needed to treat medical conditions.

Appendix A.

A.1. Derivation of (3): The MCE_d and SPI_d indexes were defined in (1) and (2) as:

\[
MCE_d = \frac{\sum c_{d,s}^2 x_{d,s}^2 / N_d^2}{\sum c_{d,s}^2 x_{d,s}^1 / N_d^1}, \quad (A1)
\]

\[
SPI_d = \frac{\sum c_{d,s}^2 x_{d,s}^1}{\sum c_{d,s}^1 x_{d,s}^1}, \quad (A2)
\]

We want to derive (3), which boils down to showing that

\[
MCE_d - SPI_d = \sum_{d|s} SPI_{d,s}(dU_{d,s} - 1). \quad (A3)
\]

with \(SPI_{d,s} = c_{d,s}^2 x_{d,s}^1 / (\sum_{d,s} c_{d,s}^1 x_{d,s}^1)\) (i.e., \(SPI_d = \sum_s SPI_{d,s}\)) and \(dU_{d,s} = (x_{d,s}^2 / N_d^2) / (x_{d,s}^1 / N_d^1)\).

To show this, we restate the two indexes in terms of \(SPI_{d,s}\) and \(dU_{d,s}\) and then take the difference in (A3). Beginning with \(MCE_d\), first multiply each term in the numerator by \([x_{d,s}^1 / N_d^1]/[x_{d,s}^1 / N_d^1]\) and restate it as:

\[
MCE_d = \frac{\sum_{d,s} c_{d,s}^2 x_{d,s}^2 / N_d^2 (x_{d,s}^1 / N_d^1)}{\sum_{d,s} c_{d,s}^1 x_{d,s}^1 / N_d^1}, \quad (A3)
\]

Some think that increased use of prescription drugs, not just new drugs, can reduce non-drug spending through more nuanced channels, but that evidence is mixed: for example, Lichtenberg (2001) finds that newer drugs involve bigger offsets while Duggan (2005) and Frank et al. (2006) find the opposite.

Next, factor out $1/N_d^2$ from the numerator and denominator, switch the $x$’s and $N$’s in the numerator (specifically, $x_{d,s}^1$ for $x_{d,s}^2$ and $N_d^1$ for $N_d^2$), and note the definitions of SPI$_d$ and $dU_d$, to obtain a term that is the numerator of the SPI$_d$ multiplied by a utilization term:

$$MCE_d = \frac{\sum_d c_{d,s}^2 x_{d,s}^1 dU_d}{\sum_d c_{d,s}^2 x_{d,s}^1} = \sum_s \text{SPI}_d dU_d,$$

As noted above, the SPI index can be written as SPI$_d = \sum_s \text{SPI}_d$ so that the difference in the two indexes is as given in (A3).

A.2. SPI in Eq. (5) can also be written as a weighted average of service indexes

Official price indexes for medical care begin with price indexes for each service and then aggregate up over all services using expenditure shares from period 1 (i.e., Laspeyres weights). Define a service price index for service $s$ as SPI$_s = \sum_d c_{d,s}^2 x_{d,s}^1 / \sum_d c_{d,s}^2 x_{d,s}^1$. Although we do not normally express these in terms of the underlying conditions, this is not too far from what the BLS actually does. For inpatient care, for example, they choose certain DRGs, like heart surgery, and track the price of that DRG over time. With office visits, they choose a representative bill (a visit for a mix of conditions) and price that over time. The link is more tenuous for drugs because BLS prices by medication class (i.e. NDC) while an SPI for drugs, as defined above, prices drugs for specific conditions – to the extent that drug prices vary across conditions, then the SPI index above would diverge from the way BLS actually prices pharmaceuticals (Table A1).

To show the connection between a weighted average of SPIs for services and the SPI defined in Eq. (5), let the expenditure share for service $s$ in period 1, $w_s$, be $\sum_d c_{d,s}^1 x_{d,s}^1 / \sum_d c_{d,s}^1 x_{d,s}^1$, and form the weighted average:

$$\sum_s w_s \text{SPI}_s = \sum_s \sum_d c_{d,s}^1 x_{d,s}^1 \text{SPI}_s = \sum_d \sum_s c_{d,s}^2 x_{d,s}^1 \text{SPI}_s$$

The ratio of double sums in the last term is exactly what one obtains if one takes a weighted average of SPIs for individual conditions, as defined in (5):

$$\text{SPI} = \sum_d w_d \text{SPI}_d = \sum_d \left[ \frac{\sum_s c_{d,s}^1 x_{d,s}^1}{\sum_s c_{d,s}^1 x_{d,s}^1} \right] \text{SPI}_d = \sum_d \sum_s c_{d,s}^1 x_{d,s}^1 \text{SPI}_d \sum_s c_{d,s}^1 x_{d,s}^1$$

Appendix B. Supplementary data